








Do cross border and domestic acquisitions differ? Evidence from the 








We investigate the determinants of short term wealth effects for both public acquiring and target 
shareholders following the announcement of UK acquisitions over the period 1990-2005. 
Regardless of their nationality, overall acquirers incur losses, with domestic acquirers under-
performing cross-border acquirers in general. For the latter no differences in returns between 
regions are found once the differences in corporate governance regimes are controlled for. 
Instead it is firm characteristics and in particular firm leverage that largely explains acquirers 
returns. All targets gain significantly but the higher returns associated with international deals 




Cross border transactions are a key feature of the merger wave of the 1990s (Martynova & 
Renneboog, 2008) with a threefold increase in the volume of cross border deals compared to 
domestic transactions over the past twenty years (Mantecon 2009). More recently Erel, Liao and 
Weisbach (2012) establish that one third of global deals involve firms from different countries. 
Developed countries account for over two thirds of cross border acquisitions with the UK at the 
forefront accounting for the majority of European deals, (Faccio & Masulis, 2005). Yet 
compared to domestic merger and acquisitions (M&As) our understanding of cross border 
transactions is limited and mixed. This is especially true in the context of the UK.  
 
This is surprising as the UK is the predominant market for corporate control in Europe 
(Martynova & Renneboog, 2011). This is partly due to the dispersed ownership structure of 
public firms, a well-developed and liquid stock market, a high free float of shares and high 
disclosure standards (McCahery & Reeneboog, 2002). Similar to the US, the UK has a market 
based governance regime with strong shareholder protection and extensive disclosure (La Porta 
et al,. 2000). Yet the UK has a more competitive takeover market than that of the US, (Moeller & 
Schlingemann, 2005). Firmly rooted in common law tradition, the strict takeover legislation 
reinforces the strength of investor protection in the UK which contributes to an active takeover 
market.  
 
Despite this, much of the empirical work on the UK focuses on outward acquisitions (Aw & 
Chatterjee 2000: Gregory & McCorriston 2005: Conn et al,. 2005) with only Danbolt (1995), 
(2004) and Danbolt & Maciver (2012) focusing on inward acquisitions into the UK. More 
recently, Goergen & Renneboog, (2004), Moeller & Schlingemann (2005), Moschieri & Campa 
(2009) and Martynova & Renneboog (2011b) present evidence of the uniqueness of the UK 
market, which partly motivates for this study. 
 
Given the limited research on inward acquisitions into the UK and the distinctiveness of this 
market the aim of this paper is to improve our knowledge of these phenomena by examining the 
short term announcement effects for shareholders in acquiring and target firms following the 
announcement of a UK bid during the 1990-2005 time frame. Within this environment we 
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compare returns to the different sets of domestic and international bidders and their targets. We 
focus on publicly listed companies. In addition we examine the determinants of shareholders’ 
returns in bidders and targets using firm specific data as called for by Moeller & Schlingemann 
(2005).  
 
Our study contributes to the M&A literature by providing new evidence on the determinants of 
wealth effects for domestic and international acquirers in the UK together with their targets.  The 
nature of the market for corporate control in the target country can impact on acquirer’s wealth 
(Fatemi & Furtado, 1988; Markides & Ittner, 1994; Corhay & Rad 2000).  Bris & Cabolis (2008) 
call for further work into analysing domestic and cross border mergers, and so we add to the 
work of Danbolt (1995), (2004) and Danbolt & Maciver (2012), who examine returns to foreign 
acquirers into the UK, in several ways.  First, we compare returns between domestic and 
international acquirers; second, we control for firm specific factors; third, we control for 
differences in the levels of shareholder protection and across time using the methodology of 
Martynova & Renneboog (2011b).  
 
Whilst our results demonstrate that returns to all acquirers are, on average, significantly less than 
zero, the analysis suggests returns to foreign acquirers exceed those of domestic firms. Further 
analysis within the group of foreign acquirers reveals that the experience of overseas acquiring 
firms is far from uniform, with acquisitions by US firms destroying significantly more wealth 
than those of European acquirers although this effect disappears once the corporate governance 
regimes are controlled for. In sharp contrast to the acquiring firm experience, all target 
shareholders gain significantly but whilst returns from cross border acquisitions are marginally 
greater, the difference compared to domestic transactions is not significant.  
 
Our paper shows some differences between the factors that drive returns to foreign acquirers and 
their targets compared to those that influence returns to domestic acquirers and their targets. In 
particular, the relationship between gearing and returns in acquiring firms differ markedly 
between domestic and cross-border deals.  In domestic acquisitions, gearing exhibits a positive 
relationship with acquirers return, a result consistent with Jensen’s (1986) Free Cash Flow 
hypothesis, but for foreign acquirers, and especially for European acquirers, the relationship is 
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negative.  For targets of domestic bidders, the significant determinants of their returns are target 
profitability, which has a positive effect with relative size, and bidder toehold which has a 
negative impact, whilst for targets of foreign bidders the significant determinants are the 
exchange rate strength and form of payment offered with some variation between targets of US 
and European acquirers. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we present the research background with a brief 
review of the relevant literature and testable predictions. Section 3 is devoted to the data and 
methodology. The results are presented in Section 4 followed by the discussion and conclusion 
in Section 5.   
 
2. Research background 
2.1  Related literature 
The motives for acquirers engaging in merger and acquisitions are well documented in the 
domestic literature (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993) in some contrast to cross border settings 
(Enel et al., 2012). International mergers and acquisitions can be value enhancing as they act as 
vehicles to bridge imperfections in factor, product and capital markets, (Doukas & Travlos 1988, 
Doukas 1995). Yet international deals result in more internal uncertainty for acquirers, 
(Gatignaan & Andeson, 1988), incomplete knowledge and hence a greater acquisition cost, 
(Markides & Ittner, 1994; Datta & Puia, 1995; Reuer et al., 2004).  
 
Empirical evidence from Eckbo & Thorburn (2000), Aw & Chatterjee (2004), Conn et al (2005), 
Moeller & Schlingemann (2005) and Martynova & Renneboog (2008) suggest lower returns for 
acquirers from cross border deals in contrast to domestic deals. Yet more recent evidence finds 
acquirers fare better in cross border deals, Goergen & Renneboog (2004), Feito-Ruiz & 
Menendez-Requejo (2011), Danbolt & Maciver (2012) and Dutta, Saadi & Zhui (2013). 
 
The empirical and theoretical literature on cross border studies is still its infancy (Bertrand & 
Zuniga, 2006). Of the limited empirical evidence on cross border mergers conducted much of the 
focus has been on US based firms (Erel et al, 2012). Some evidence suggests significant 
differences in target returns from domestic as oppose to international acquisitions. Evidence in 
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support of this effect is documented in the US by Harris & Ravenscraft (1991), Swenson (1993) 
and Eun et al, (1996), in the UK by Danbolt (2004), and across Europe by Campa & Hernando 
(2004). Yet Servaes & Zenner (1990), Dewenter (1995), Eckbo & Thornburn (2000) and 
Goergen & Renneboog (2004) find no support for the presence of a cross border effect for target 
shareholders.  
 
In summary, the evidence on the wealth effects of international acquisitions for acquiring and 
target firm shareholders is inconclusive. Similar to Eckbo & Thorburn (2000) we undertake an 
experiment of two different sets of bidders participating in the same market for corporate control.  
We differ from them in that international acquirers in our sample are more geographically 
dispersed. Furthermore we test for the presence of a cross border effect for UK target 
shareholders and for the determinants of returns to both sets of acquirers and targets using firm 
specific data. 
 
2.2  Testable predictions 
Returns to acquirers in foreign markets may vary to those generated in domestic markets due to 
the benefits/costs of geographical diversification that arise from cross border deals.  Cross border 
mergers enable firms to expand their boundaries (Conn et al., 2005).  If this form of 
diversification is of value to acquiring firms we would expect their announcement returns to 
exceed those of domestic acquirers, lending support for the multinational network theory.  On the 
other hand gains to domestic buyers may exceed those of their foreign counterparts due to the 
cost of geographic diversification being outweighed by the benefits to the foreign buyer and/or 
due to information asymmetry problems experienced by the foreign acquirer.  Our foreign 
sample is divided into two regions namely the US, and Europe1.The justification for these 
groupings is that they account for ninety per cent of our sample but yet differ in terms of 
shareholder protection.  Both the UK and the US can be classified as having very high standards 
of investor protection in contrast to most European countries (Hagendorff et al,. 2008). 
 
                                                 
1 We also include a third category, “Rest of the World”, but the sub-samples for regions within this category are too 
small to allow any meaningful analysis to be carried out. 
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The role of investor regime in target countries for international acquirers has been investigated 
more recently in cross border studies with conflicting evidence emerging. Moeller & 
Schlingemann (2005) find that acquisitions of UK targets generate lower returns for US 
acquirers than Canadian, French and German targets, who attribute this to the strength of the 
shareholder protection regime in the UK as acquirers have to pay a premium to targets to 
compensate them for adopting a weaker corporate governance system (Kuipers, Miller & Patel, 
2009 and Starks & Wei, 2013).  Similarly Martynova & Renneboog (2011a) establish that UK 
targets generate higher returns than their Continental peers in both domestic and cross border 
deals. This is consistent with Rossi & Volpin’s (2004) evidence of superior gains to targets the 
greater the strength of their investor protection regime. In contrast, Dahlquist et al (2003) 
establish that acquirers gain from acquisitions of targets from well protected environments due to 
the higher disclosure and lower agency costs associated with these deals. Given the above, we 
test the role of the domicile of the acquirer on acquiring and target shareholder returns. We adopt 
the methodology devised by Martynova & Renneboog (2011a) who compile a very 
comprehensive set of corporate governance indices capturing all the major changes in corporate 
governance regulation from 1990 to 2005 (same time frame as our sample) across the US and 
European countries. Four measures are employed in this study, namely the anti-director index (as 
per La Porta et al, 1997,1998) which is extensively used, whilst the second one, shareholder 
rights protection index is the summation of shareholder rights to appoint directors, shareholder 
decision power, board structure and information availability to shareholders. The other two 
measures encapsulate indices capturing minority shareholder rights protection and creditor rights 
protection. Similar to Martynova & Renneboog (2011a), we capture the differences in each 
measure for acquiring and target companies for our foreign sub-sample before summing the 
differences across the four measures to give a total difference, (TOTDIFF). A positive difference 
suggests greater shareholder (or creditor) protection in the country of the acquirer than that of the 
target while a negative difference suggest greater shareholder (or creditor) protection in the 
country of the target to that of the acquirer. As the target country, the UK affords higher 
shareholder protection in all cases, whilst in terms of creditor protection the UK offers equal or 
greater protection, with the exception of some European countries namely Denmark, Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Germany, with differences in the latter ceasing from 2000 onwards.  
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The characteristics of acquiring firms may have an impact on their returns. If markets are 
efficient, valuation metrics such as market to book [MTBV]) should be reflective of the firm’s 
investment opportunity set and managerial skill.  Under Q-theory, Tobin’s Q (typically proxied 
by MTBV) is simply a proxy for growth opportunities.  Alternatively, behavioural finance 
theories (such as that of Shleifer & Vishny, 2003) might view such metrics as potential proxies 
for over or under valuation.  Support for the mis-valuation hypothesis from overpayment by 
glamour acquirers has been well documented in domestic studies for the US by Dong et al,. 
(2006) and Ang & Chen (2005), and in the UK by Bi & Gregory (2011), although Dong et al 
(2006) also find support for the Q-hypothesis. By contrast, Bi & Gregory (2011) find more 
support for the over-valuation hypothesis than the Q-theory of mergers, although these results are 
only found in the long run returns, not the announcement period returns. Returns to acquiring 
firms have been found to depend on specific resources of their targets. Hence we use the relative 
Q ratio to proxy for the growth potential of the merged entity. 
 
Several studies test the free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis of Jensen (1986) which finds that firms 
with unused borrowing capacity and/or large free cash flow are more likely to engage in value 
destroying acquisitions (Harford 1999, Lang, Stulz and Walking 1991). We test for the 
importance of FCF by controlling for cash resources in both acquiring and target firms, and by 
measuring their pre-bid gearing ratios.  We also capture the past performance of target firms 
through the use of the return on equity variable. Goergen & Renneboog (2004) find that targets 
gain more the higher their return on equity.    
 
The role of the exchange rates has been well documented in the international literature with 
acquirers hypothesised to gain the stronger their currency vis a vis their target resulting in lower 
financing costs for them (Froot & Stein, 1991; Kang, 1993; Markides & Ittner, 1994; Conn et al., 
2005).  Alternatively acquirers may lose the stronger their currency is, as the value of future 
repatriated profits will be lower (Cakici, 1991).  We test for the significance of the exchange rate 
on the wealth of foreign acquirers using a similar procedure to Harris & Ravenscraft (1991), 
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Kiymaz & Mukherjee (2000) and Gregory & McCorriston (2005) to calculate exchange rate 
strength2.  
 
Considerable debate exists about the sources of value (synergy) for acquiring firms. The most 
commonly tested source is operating synergy whereby related acquisitions are thought to be 
more synergistic due to greater potential for economies of scale/scope and lower integration 
costs compared to unrelated deals.  Evidence in support of relatedness in both domestic literature 
include Morck et al (1988), Slusky & Caves (1991), and in the international literature by Fatemi 
& Furtado (1988), Markides & Ittner (1994), Goergen & Renneboog (2004), Moeller & 
Schlingemann (2005) and Dos Santos et al,. (2008). In contrast, Doukas & Travlos (1988) and 
Conrad & Rad (2000) find superior gains from product diversification by international acquirers. 
We test for the significance of acquiring and target firms being in the same industry sector using 
the 2 digit SIC codes to proxy for relatedness. Finally we test for the impact of a bidding firm 
toehold in the target firm in a similar form to Sundarsanam et al (1996). Such an investment 
reduces free rider problems and deters competing bids resulting in larger gain to acquirers (Stulz 
et al,. 1990, Betton & Eckbo, 2000 and Mantecon, 2009), whilst lowering returns for targets. 
 
We control for a number of variables including relative firm size, bid reaction and form of 
payment.  Greater gains have been found to accrue to acquirers the larger their target (Asquith et 
al, 1983; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989; Markides & Ittner, 1994; Danbolt, 1995; Fuller, Netter & 
Stegemoller, 2002; Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005).  The assertion is that large combinations 
result in revenue enhancement and cost savings via greater economies of scale.  Alternatively, 
large acquirers may overpay for smaller targets due to insignificant wealth effects for them 
(Loderner & Martin, 1990) or larger combinations will cost more to integrate (Agrawal, Jaffe & 
Mandelker, 1992; Beitel & Schiereck & Wahrenburg, 2004)   Hostile deals are more common in 
the UK than in any other country (Moschieri & Campa 2009), and hence we control for bid 
reaction. 
 
                                                 
2 The exchange rate of the foreign currency (in terms of £) on the announcement day is first de-meaned and then 
scaled by its mean. 
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Finally, we control for payment form as acquirers may use a variety of forms including cash, 
shares or a mixed consideration.  Empirical evidence suggests acquirers lose from share 
exchanges because it signals over valuation of acquirers stock or uncertainty over the true value 
of the target, (Conn & Nielsen, 1977; Bradley, 1980; Dodd, 1980; Myers & Majluf, 1984; 
Travlos, 1987; Franks & Harris, 1989; Loughran & Vinjh, 1997; Walker 2000).  However 
foreign bids primarily (although not exclusively) are all cash, partly due to target shareholders’ 
reluctance to accept foreign equity (Gaughan, 2002).  The form of payment is often cited for the 
presence of a positive cross border effect for target shareholders, so we are careful to control for 
this effect.  The full detail of these variables is given in Table 1. 
 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The sample consists of completed acquisitions of UK public companies for the period 1990 to 
2005. The acquiring firms are listed domestic (UK) or international (US, European, Rest of the 
World) with deal values greater than £1 million and involve the acquisition of more than 50% of 
shares acquired. The data on the acquisitions is obtained from Thomson Financial Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) and Thomson Financial Datastream is our source for all returns and 
financial data.  We require data to be available on market capitalisation and returns, together 
with the full information needed to calculate all the firm specific variables for both acquirer and 
target companies.   
 
The final sample consists of 288 completed acquisitions, of which 169 are purely domestic and 
119 are foreign.  Of these foreign acquirers, 56 are from the US, 51 are from the EU, and 12 are 
from other countries. The nationality of the acquirers is shown in Table 2 where we see that 
domestic takeovers comprise 59% of the sample.  By far the largest overseas acquirer nation is 
the US, with 56 deals, followed by France and Germany with 14 each. Table 3 shows the 
acquisition activity each year.  The number of foreign acquisitions increases over time with just 
over under two thirds of these takeovers occurring in the latter half of the sample time period. 
 
3.2 Method 
Following Alexandridis (2008), Draper & Paudyal (2008), Hagendorff et al,. (2008), and 
Petmezas (2009) we calculate cumulative abnormal returns for the 5-day period (-2,2) days 
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around the announcement date. In the absence of any wholly convincing evidence on the most 
appropriate model for estimating abnormal returns, particularly in the UK (Michou, Mouselli & 
Stark (2007); Gregory & Michou, 2009), we choose to use simple market-adjusted returns 
(MARs) in this investigation.  Draper and Paudyal (2008) also favour a market adjusted returns 
model.  Although our mean abnormal returns are similar using the market model, we prefer 
MARs as close inspection of the market-model parameters shows some implausible beta values 
in some cases, almost certainly as a result of thin trading problems.  Despite the obvious 
advantage of avoiding such thin trading problems, the use of market-adjusted returns has the 
disadvantage of not providing regression estimates and so not allowing the use of Patell t-tests.  
We could, of course, simply rely upon a cross-sectional t-test (which we report) to form 
inferences, but instead choose to allow for the possibility of non-normality in the 5-day return 
window abnormal returns by using the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic described in 
Lyon et al (1999), more normally associated with long-term return studies.  We further test for 
non-normality by running a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for differences of the MAR medians from 
zero.  
 
We then run regression tests using these Bidder and Target CARs as dependent variables, with a 
range of variables selected to test the hypotheses described above.  All regressions we report use 
White (1980) corrections for heteroscedasticity.  Specifically, we regress the 5-day event 
window CARs on: 
CAR = α + β1 LOGRELQ + β2 CASHRESBID + β3 CASHRESTGT + β4 BIDGEAR + 
β5TGTGEAR + β6 ROETGT + β7 RELATEDDUM + β8 LOGRELSIZE + β9 SHARES + β10 
BIDTOE+ β11 HOSTILE+ ε 
For the sub-samples of foreign bids, we include FOREX, and TOTDIFF. Table 4 shows the 
correlation matrix of the variables used. The results for the Bidder and Targets and their 
subsamples are reported in separate regression models in Tables 7 and 8.3 
 
                                                 
3 In general, we do not control for tax effects as conducted by Manzon, Sharp & Travlos (1994) as unlike their 
sample period there are no clear examples of tax regimes changing in the period we investigate.  However, Huizinga 
& Voget (2009) show that when the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 enabled (albeit temporarily) US 
multinationals to repatriate profits at a flat rate of 5.25% from October 2004 to the end of 2005 this resulted in a six 
fold increase in repatriated profits. We tested for this by including a dummy variable for US acquisitions completed 
from October 2004 onwards.  As this variable was insignificant for both bidders and targets, and none of our other 
inferences change, we have not reported these results in the paper. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Announcement returns of acquirers and targets 
Table 5 reports the announcement returns for the 5-day window for the full sample and sub-
samples based on domicile of acquirer.  Results for acquirers are reported in Panel A while those 
for targets are contained in Panel B. The clear message that emerges from the CARs is that the 
acquisition of UK listed targets is a significantly wealth-reducing event for bidders as a whole. 
This is consistent with the evidence of Alexandridis, Petmezas & Travlos (2010) that the greater 
the competition for public targets as in the case of the UK, US and Canada the lower acquirers 
returns. Mean announcement period abnormal returns are -1.07%, with a median of -0.62%, a 
result that is statistically significant both in terms of the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-test, a 
simple cross-sectional t-test or a test for the median being significantly different from zero. 
Domestic acquirers experience significant negative abnormal returns of -1.30% compared to an 
insignificant -0.75% for foreign bidders, a result robust using medians rather than means. This 
supports our first hypothesis of differences in returns across domicile of acquirer and concurs 
with the evidence of Kang (1993), Goergen & Renneboog (2004), Martynova & Renneboog 
(2011) and Danbolt and Maciver (2012). 
 
Amongst the foreign bidders, US acquirers do relatively badly whilst EU acquirers do relatively 
well.  US acquirers earn a significant announcement period return of -1.39%, a result that is 
significant (p= 0.04 using our preferred bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic), whereas EU 
acquirers earn an insignificant -0.23% on announcement. This differs from Danbolt (1995) who 
finds US acquirers performed better than European acquirers in the UK. These overall negative 
announcement period returns for acquirers, together with the fact that there are clear inter-
country differences, may suggest the importance of both the strength of the investor protection in 
the target country and to a more limited extent in the country of the acquirer. Datta & Puia 
(1995) and Doukas & Kan (2006) establish that global diversification is loss making for US 
acquirers. Moeller & Schlingemann (2005) also establish lower announcement returns for US 
acquirers from the acquisition of UK targets which they attribute to the sophistication of 
shareholder protection regime in the UK.  More recently Francis et al (2008) demonstrate 
positive wealth effects for US acquirers but only for those into countries with a weak legal and 
institutional environment. However, Hagendorff et al (2008) establish that US acquirers 
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experience lower announcement returns than their European counterparts but their sample is 
restricted to bank mergers. We see here that the effect carries through to a broader sample, and it 
is of interest that the significant negative returns are associated with bidders from the UK and US 
only. Hence we will control for differences in the strength of investor protection in the 
multivariate analysis. 
 
In contrast, target returns are significantly positive across all markets.  The average 5-day CAR 
is 20.96% for all targets, and although cross-border targets have slightly higher returns than 
domestic targets (22.84% compared to 19.50%), the difference is not significant using a 
conventional t-test for differences which differs to Danbolt (2004) and Danbolt and Maciver 
(2012). US acquired targets earn the highest returns (25.30%) compared to European acquired 
targets (20.07%) although the difference is only marginally significant consistent with Danbolt 
(2004) and Danbolt and Maciver (2012).  
 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis:   
The results reported so far signify variation in returns to acquirers across their domicile in 
contrast to the more homogenous nature of target returns. A multivariate regression framework is 
used to identify the role of deal and firm specific variables in explaining these abnormal returns. 
We also test for the significance of US and European acquirers in the foreign sub-sample given 
the results established earlier. Summary statistics for these variables are presented for the full 
sample, the domestic sub-sample, and the foreign sub-sample in Table 6.  
 
Significant differences between domestic and foreign sub-samples are as follows.  First, foreign 
bidders have a smaller relative size of target, and a smaller bidder toehold.  Not surprisingly, the 
proportion of bidders offering equity is significantly higher for domestic bidders. At the 10% 
level, the cash resources of domestic bidders are smaller than those of the foreign bidders.  Last, 
given the results that follow, we emphasise that bidder or target gearing does not differ 
significantly between UK and foreign acquirers. 
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Table 7 presents the regression estimates where the dependent variable is the 5 day CAR to all 
acquiring firms and the domestic, foreign, US and EU subsamples also. A combination of firm 
and transaction characteristics are shown to determine acquirers returns. Greater explanatory 
power emerges for domestic acquiring firm returns in contrast to foreign acquirers.  
 
Relative market valuations are important for overall returns and the result is consistent with the 
Schleifer & Vishny (2003) hypothesis, which is concerned with relative over valuation rather 
than any absolute valuation metric. The market is wary of overvaluation but only in the domestic 
sub-sample.  
 
Noticeably acquirer gearing has a positive impact on bidder returns overall, and this clearly 
shows through in the domestic sub-sample.  Maloney et al,. (1993) find a positive relationship 
between returns to US acquiring firms around announcement and their own leverage prior to the 
merger. However, acquirer gearing has a significant negative association with cross-border 
acquirer returns and this is significant also for the European acquirers. Gregory & Wang 
(forthcoming) establish that bidders’ gearing has a negative association with their announcement 
period returns in the case of pure cash acquirers.  Since our foreign sample acquire mainly for 
cash, whilst the domestic sample acquire mainly for equity, this effect could be present here. 
Cross border deals are paid for with cash sourced from internal funds and/or borrowings. Bidders 
acquiring overseas may experience difficulty in borrowing to finance such deals (Martynova & 
Renneboog 2009) and this is likely to more problematic in Europe where creditor protection has 
weakened (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011).  
 
Similarly Doukas & Kan (2006) report losses to US acquirers in overseas markets is closely 
related to their own leverage. Gregory & Wang (forthcoming) conjecture that the negative 
relationship in cash only bids may be reflective of market concerns over the likelihood of 
financial distress, following cash acquisitions by leveraged firms. Leverage of the combined 
entity is likely to increase post the merger which the market appears wary about (Ghosh & Jain 
2006; Morellec & Zhaanov 2008). Kling et al (2011) also demonstrate that returns to Chinese 
acquirers in cross border deals is negatively related to their own leverage, which suggests 
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regardless of the source of debt overseas acquisitions are a source of financial risk for acquiring 
firms. 
 
Target firm characteristics are also important, as acquiring cash rich targets has a significant 
negative impact on acquirers’ returns overall, a result that also holds in the domestic sub-sample. 
Target profitability has a positive impact on acquirers returns overall but only in the foreign sub-
sample.  
 
Overall, acquirers lose from larger transactions, consistent with Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker 
(1992) and Beitel, Schiereck & Wahrenburg (2004) but this only holds for the domestic sub-
sample. Surprisingly, acquirers overall gain from industry diversification, although this is 
significant only in the domestic context.  
 
In common with findings elsewhere in the literature, equity financed acquisitions are 
significantly negatively associated with acquirers returns overall, although this fails to be 
significant in either the domestic or foreign sub-sample.. Foreign exchange effects are 
significant, but only for the European sub-sample. Whilst controlling for the difference in 
corporate governance regimes of the acquirer and targets in the foreign subsamples offers no 
explanatory power, in unreported tests we note that it is important in explaining the under-
performance of US acquirers, in so far as with no controls for governance, US acquirers would 
appear to under-perform other foreign acquirers. Once governance is controlled for, this is no 
longer the case. Similarly controlling for differences in international taxation (not reported) 
provides no explanatory power. 
 
In summary, it is interesting that fears of overvaluation and support for the FCF hypothesis apply 
to domestic acquirers only, in contrast to foreign buyers where the main concern is their own 
gearing level. Target resources appear to matter especially target liquidity for domestic acquirers 
while target profitability matters more for foreign acquirers. 
 
Turning to Table 8, where the results for target firms are presented, it appears that deal 
characteristics are the most important determinants of target returns. Few of the firm specific 
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variables are significant except for target profitability and, to a more limited extent, bidder 
liquidity, with evidence that more profitable domestic targets earn higher premia, affirming the 
Goergen & Renneboog (2004) result. Target profitability is inversely related to returns for targets 
of European acquirers, whilst bidder liquidity is positively related to returns for targets of US 
acquirers, suggesting rather different factors motivate US acquirers compared to EU acquirers, 
with target premia adjusted accordingly. Relatively large combinations are associated with lower 
returns for targets overall, a result consistent with Campa & Hernando (2004), but this is only 
found in the domestic market. As predicted, the presence of a toe-hold by bidders has a negative 
and significant impact on target returns overall, a result consistent with Betton, Eckbo & 
Thorburn (2009), in that toeholds reduce offer prices for targets and deters rival bids. This 
negative and significant association applies to both the domestic and European sub samples, 
despite toeholds being less prevalent in foreign acquired firms (as shown in Table 5). Similarly, 
and as expected, overall hostile bidders pay more for targets, consistent with Goergen & 
Renneboog (2004) and Martynova & Renneboog (2006) although this result holds only for the 
European sub-sample. Foreign acquired targets, and European ones in particular, gain 
significantly the weaker their exchange rate relative to their acquirers. Furthermore returns for 
these cross border targets, and targets of US buyers in particular, are higher when shares are not 
part of the payment. Finally, in the European sub-sample some support is shown for the 
significance of the differences in corporate governance regime, as UK targets lose from 
acquisitions into different (and weaker) regimes as mechanisms in place in the country of their 




In this paper we examine the short term wealth effects of UK acquisitions for both acquiring and 
target firm shareholders using a sample of 290 acquisitions from 1990-2005. We include 
international acquirers in the analysis and deploy a comprehensive set of firm specific data in 
order to assess the determinants of shareholder returns. We hypothesise that returns to acquirers 
differ across their domicile due not only to geographical diversification but also to differences in 
shareholder protection regimes.  
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Furthermore we test for the impact of mis-valuation, free cash flow, target profitability, exchange 
rate strength and relatedness (operational synergy proxy) in explaining acquirer and target 
shareholder returns.  
 
We find, consistent with the literature, that overall acquirers experience negative announcement 
period returns. Taken as a whole, domestic firms fare worse than their foreign counterparts, but 
within the foreign sub-set, US acquirers under-perform relative to their European counterparts 
but this disappears once we control for differences in the corporate governance regimes. Target 
shareholders gain significant positive announcement returns but there are no significant 
differences between domestic and international deals. 
 
Our cross-sectional analysis reveals differences in the determinants of acquirers’ and target 
wealth with some support presented for the role of free cash flow in explaining returns. For 
domestic acquirers’ relative size, related deals, relative Q ratio and target cash resources have a 
negative influence, while their own gearing level has a positive influence. Importantly, though, 
the results for gearing are completely different between domestic and foreign sub-samples. 
Bidder gearing has a positive relationship with domestic acquirer returns, a result that is 
consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. However, for foreign bidders, acquirer gearing has 
a negative relationship with acquirer returns and holds particularly for European acquirers. 
Highly geared acquirers purchasing overseas targets would be undertaking a considerable riskier 
investment strategy than would the same highly geared acquirer purchasing a domestic target. 
Finally, we note that the foreign acquirers gain more the greater the profitability of their targets 
and in the case of the European sub-sample the stronger their own currency relative to sterling. 
 
Similarly returns to targets differ somewhat between the domestic and cross-border sub-samples. 
For targets of domestic acquirers, their relative size and bidder’s toehold are all associated with 
lower target returns while target profitability is associated with higher target returns. For the 
targets of foreign bidders’ acquisition by equity and the stronger the relative exchange rate the 
lower target returns. For US acquired targets acquisition by equity lowers their returns while they 
gain the greater the cash resources of their acquirer. Targets of European acquirers gain more 
from hostile deals and lose the greater their own profitability, the stronger the relative exchange 
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rate, when acquirers have a toehold and are from a different corporate governance regime to that 
of the UK. 
 
Overall the results in this study provide evidence that UK acquisitions have an adverse impact on 
acquirers’ wealth, especially for domestic and, to a lesser extent for US acquirers, which do not 
spill into higher returns for each of their respective targets. Future research could focus on 
providing a more thorough rational for the poorer performance of UK acquirers in their home 
market which is likely to have policy implications given the better performance depicted for 
European acquirers into the UK. The ‘positive’ cross border effect seems to have disappeared for 
target shareholders, which may be partly reflective of changing international conditions in the 
global marketplace. Finally, the difference depicted for the significance of acquirers’ gearing 
across the domestic and foreign subsamples is worthy of further exploration.  
 
Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
LOGRELSIZE The log of the relative size of the market value of the target to that of the acquirer as at 3 
months pre-bid 
RELATEDDUM Dummy equal to one if the acquirer and target share the same 2-digit SIC code 
BIDTOE The percentage of any toehold shareholding that the acquirer has in the target 
LOGRELQ The log of market-to-book of the acquirer less that of the target 
HOSTILE Dummy equal to one if the acquisition is defined as hostile by SDC Platinum 
SHARES Dummy equal to one if the acquirer finances the bid using equity or part equity 
BIDGEAR Debt to market value ratio of the acquirer as at year end prior to deal announcement 
TGTGEAR Debt to market value ratio of the target as at year end prior to deal announcement 
CASHRESBID Cash and marketable assets of the acquirer divided by acquirer net assets at year end prior to 
deal announcement 
CASHRESTGT Cash and marketable assets of the  target divided by target net assets as at year end prior to 
deal announcement 
ROETGT The return on equity of the target as at year end prior to bid announcement 
FOREX A de-meaned exchange rate of the foreign currency (in terms of £) at the time of the bid 
normalised by the average (in the case of the Eurozone countries using a shadow rate before 
the inception of the Euro) 
TOTDIFF 
 
Sum of the difference in the corporate governance regime in acquiring and target for 
countries, i.e difference in the anti-director index, shareholder rights protection, minority 
shareholder rights protection and creditor rights protection indices as defined by Martynova 
& Renneboog (2011b) 
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Table 2: Distribution of acquisitions by Country of Acquirer  
Frequency by Country of Acquirer Number Percentage 
Australia 2 0.69 
Belgium 2 0.69 
Canada 2 0.69 
Denmark 5 1.73 
Finland 1 0.34 
France 14 4.86 
Germany 14 4.86 
Ireland 3 1.04 
Italy  2 0.69 
Japan 4 1.38 
Netherlands 6 2.08 
Spain 2 0.69 
Sweden 2 0.69 
Switzerland 4 1.38 
United Kingdom 169 58.6897 
United States 56 19.44 
Total 288 100 
Note: the table presents the number of acquisitions and percentage of the total number of acquisitions across country 
of acquirer. The summary statistics are provided on the basis of a sample of 288 acquisitions from 1990-2005. 
Acquirers are publicly listed in their domestic stock market. 
 
 
Table 3: Distribution of acquisitions by year  
 















1990 12 4.2 5 (2.9) 7 (5.9) 1 (1.8) 5 (9.8) 
1991 16 5.6 11 (6.5) 5 (4.2) 1 (1.8) 3 (5.9) 
1992 3 1.0 1 (0.6) 2 (1.7) 1 (1.8) 0 (0) 
1993 4 1.3 3 (1.8) 1 (0.8) 1 (1.8) 0 (0) 
1994 7 2.5 5 (2.9) 2 (1.7) 2 (3.6) 0(0) 
1995 15 5.2 7(4.2) 8 (6.7) 4 (7.1) 3 (5.9) 
1996 3 1.0 1 (0.6) 2 (1.7) 0 (0) 1 (2.0) 
1997 31 10.7 16 (9.5) 15 (12.6) 10 (17.9) 5 (9.8) 
1998 36 12.5 16 (9.4) 20 (16.8) 12 (21.4) 7 (13.7) 
1999 34 11.8 30 (17.8) 4 (3.4) 2 (3.6) 2 (3.9) 
2000 38 13.2 19 (11.2) 19 (16.0) 6 (10.7) 9 (17.6) 
2001 14 4.9 11 (6.5) 3 (2.5) 0 (0) 3 (5.9) 
2002 12 4.2 7 (4.2) 5 (4.2) 4 (7.1) 1 (2.0) 
2003 10 3.5 5 (2.9) 5 (4.2) 5 (8.9) 0 (0) 
2004 24 8.4 14 (8.3) 10 (8.4) 4 (7.1) 6 (11.8) 
2005 29 10 18 (10.6) 11 (9.2) 3 (5.4) 6 (11.8) 
Total 288 100 169 (100) 119 (100) 56 (100) 51 (100) 
 
Note: the table presents the number of acquisitions by year and percentage of total number of acquisitions across 
domicile of acquirer (domestic and foreign, US and European). The summary statistics are provided on the basis of a 




Table 4 Correlation matrix 
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables. B2to2 and t2to2 are the five-day cumulative abnormal returns (-2,2) for acquirers and targets 
respectively. Logrelsize is the log of the relative size of the market value of the target to that of the acquirer as at 3 months pre-bid. Related is a dummy equal to one if the acquirer 
and target share the same 2-digit SIC code. Bidtoe is the percentage of any toehold shareholding that the acquirer has in the target. Logrelq is the log of market-to-book of the 
acquirer less that of the target. Bidgear is the debt to market value ratio of the acquirer as at year end prior to deal announcement. Tgt gear is the debt to market value ratio of the 
target as at year end prior to deal announcement. Cashresbid is cash and marketable assets of the acquirer divided by acquirer’s net assets at year end prior to deal announcement. 
Cashrestgt is cash and marketable assets of the target divided by target’s net assets at year end prior to deal announcement. Roetgt is the return on equity of the target as at year end 
prior to bid announcement. Hostile is a dummy equal to one if the acquisition is defined as hostile by SDC Platinum. Shares is a dummy equal to one if the acquirer finances the 
bid using equity or part equity. Forex is a de-meaned exchange rate of the foreign currency (in terms of £) at the time of the bid normalised by the average (in the case of the 
Eurozone countries using a shadow rate before the inception of the Euro). Totdiff is the sum of the difference in the corporate governance regime in acquiring and target for 
countries, i.e difference in the anti-director index, shareholder rights protection, minority shareholder rights protection and creditor rights protection indices as defined by 
Martynova & Renneboog (2011b) 
 
 
 Correlation b2to2 t2to2 logrelsize relateddum bidtoe logrelq bidgear tgtgear cashresbid cashrestgt roetgt hostile shares forex totdiff 
B2to2 1                             
T2to2 -0.0192 1                           
Logrelsize -0.1526 -0.1855 1                         
Relateddum -0.1193 0.0328 0.072 1                       
Bidtoe 0.0534 -0.1174 0.0649 -0.0923 1                     
Logrelq -0.0712 0.0551 -0.1524 0.0333 -0.0392 1                   
Bidgear 0.1599 0.0141 0.0093 -0.0753 -0.0475 0.0744 1                 
Tgtgear -0.033 -0.0524 -0.0717 0.0222 -0.0321 -0.0188 0.0395 1               
Cashresbid -0.127 -0.0401 0.0327 -0.0071 0.0677 -0.0073 0.0027 -0.1041 1             
Cashrestgt -0.0965 0.0175 -0.0109 0.0297 -0.0049 -0.1563 -0.0489 -0.2322 0.3173 1           
Roetgt 0.1197 0.084 0.1292 -0.0382 -0.077 -0.1652 0.018 -0.1176 -0.0007 0.0944 1         
Hostile 0.0300 0.1331 0.0725 -0.0014 0.0868 -0.0169 -0.0095 0.0254 -0.0421 -0.0735 0.0184 1       
Shares -0.1976 -0.1163 0.3281 0.0534 0.072 0.0905 -0.0456 0.0142 0.0927 -0.0136 -0.0201 0.0671 1     
Forex 0.0266 -0.0563 0.0893 -0.0298 0.0166 0.0258 0.0449 -0.0197 -0.0137 0.0400 -0.1352 0.0675 0.0542 1   







Table 5: Mean and Median 5-day event window CARs 
 
Panel A: acquiring firms 
  Mean  (%)   Median (%) Conventional     Bootstrapped skewness     Wilcoxon  
                                           t-test prob            adjusted t-test                 signed rank  
                                                                                                               test prob 
CARs (-2,+2) 
Full sample) 
(n = 288) 
Domestic 
(n = 169) 
Foreign 




(n = 51) 
 
 -1.07            -0.62                 0.005                    0.015                               0.002 
 
- 1.30            -1.26                 0.019                    0.021                               0.005 
 
-0.75             -0.19                0.117                    0.148                               0.228 
 
-1.39             -0.46                0.073                    0.040                               0.119 
 
-0.23             -0.08                0.742                    0.775                               0.866 
     
 
 
Panel B: target firms 
 Mean  (%)   Median (%)     Conventional      Bootstrapped skewness   Wilcoxon  
                                           t-test prob            adjusted t-test                   signed rank  
                                                                                                                  test prob 
CARs (-2,+2) 
Full sample 
(n = 288) 
Domestic 
(n = 169) 
Foreign 
(n = 119) 
US 
(n = 56) 
EU 
(n = 51) 
 
20.96            16.93                0.000                    0.000                               0.000 
 
19.50            16.34                0.000                    0.000                               0.000 
 
22.84            18.85                0.000                    0.000                               0.000 
 
25.30            20.15                0.000                    0.000                               0.000 
 
20.07             17.31               0.000                    0.167                               0.000 
 
 
Note: this table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during 5 days (-2,+2) surrounding the 
announcement for the full sample, domestic, foreign, US and EU subsamples. Abnormal returns are calculated using 
simple market-adjusted returns. Panel A reports the CARs for acquiring firms while Panel B presents the CARs for 











Table 6: Summary statistics, partitioned by sub-sample 
 
  Mean (%) 
(all) 
Std Err Median Mean (%) 
    (domestic) 
Std Err Median Mean (%) 
(foreign)  
Std Err Median  
Diff 
Logrelsize -2.185 0.120 -1.916 -1.556 0.136 -1.456 -3.083 0.191 -3.009 --- 
Relateddum 0.536 0.029 1.000 0.547 0.038 1.000 0.521 0.046 1.000  
Bidtoe 2.013 0.533 0.000 2.847 0.865 0.000 0.822 0.370 0.000 ++ 
LogrelQ 0.410 0.063 0.395 0.469 0.086 0.467 0.327 0.092 0.286  
Hostile 0.059 0.013 0.000 0.053 0.017 0.000 0.067 0.023 0.000  
Shares 0.356 0.028 0.000 0.541 0.038 1.000 0.092 0.026 0.000 +++ 
Bidgear 0.276 0.036 0.223 0.294 0.061 0.212 0.251 0.013 0.236  
Tgtgear 0.209 0.009 0.182 0.208 0.012 0.180 0.211 0.015 0.185  
Cashrestgt 0.106 0.006 0.069 0.100 0.008 0.065 0.113 0.011 0.070  
Cashresbid 0.117 0.009 0.069 0.103 0.010 0.057 0.138 0.017 0.073 _ 
Roetgt 0.119 0.027 0.169 0.115 0.026 0.144 0.125 0.054 0.198  
Forex n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -0.024 0.007 -0.026  
Totdiff n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -14.714 0.379 -17.000  
N 288 288 288 169 169 169 119 119 119  
Note: +,++,+++ (-,--,---) denotes that the domestic variable is significantly larger (smaller) than the cross border 

































Intercept 0.001 0.018 0.015 0.074 0.016 
 
(0.10) (1.31) (0.80) (0.72) (0.48) 
Logrelq -0.006* -0.010** 0.000 0.005 0.003 
 
(-1.90) (-2.41) (0.12) (0.71) (0.42) 
Cashresbid -0.038 -0.067 -0.019 -0.041 -0.055 
 
(-1.33) (-1.61) (-.55) (-0.82) (-0.87) 
Cashrestgt -0.056** -0.101** 0.005 0.033 0.004 
 
(-2.35) (-2.95) (0.21) (0.65) (0.15) 
Bidgear 0.014*** 0.015*** -0.075** -0.081 -0.132* 
 
(5.45) (9.58) (-2.53) (-1.53) (-1.80) 
Tgtgear -0.002 -0.009 0.039 0.059 0.089 
 
(-0.07) (-0.27) (1.35) (1.06) (1.29) 
Roetgt 0.015** 0.022 0.012* 0.005 0.025 
 
(2.31) (1.30) (1.85) (0.46) (0.71) 
Relateddum -0.016** -0.025** -0.005 -0.017 0.000 
 
(-2.22) (-2.53) (-0.58) (-0.93) (0.00) 
Logrelsize -0.004** -0.005* -0.002 0.001 -0.001 
 
(-2.21) (-1.94) (-1.13) (0.24) (-0.23) 
Shares -0.013* -0.017 0.012 -0.007 0.017 
 
(-1.64) (-1.56) (0.86) (-0.29) (0.75) 
Bidtoe 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 
 
(1.60) (1.16) (1.19) (-0.21) (1.39) 
Hostile 0.001 -0.011 0.014 -0.012 0.002 
 
(0.04) (-0.46) (0.65) (-0.29) (0.04) 
Forex 0.043  0.077 -0.028 0.172* 
 
(0.87)  (1.48) (-0.19) (1.77) 
Totdiff   0.001 0.004 0.001 
 
  (1.14) (0.73) (0.30) 
N 288 169 119 56 51 
Adj Rsq 12.55% 21.83% 11.60% 11.28% 28.36% 
      
 
Note: the table shows the regression estimates of the acquirer’s five-day cumulative abnormal return (-2,2)  
surrounding the announcement controlling for acquirer and target firm and other deal characteristics. Significance 




















Intercept 0.168*** 0.151*** 0.034 0.076 0.070 
 
(5.05) (3.77) (0.37) (0.13) (0.71) 
Logrelq 0.010 0.002 0.020 -0.025 -0.010 
 
(0.70) (0.14) (0.70) (-0.60) (-0.30) 
Cashresbid -0.052 -0.124 0.167 0.585* 0.069 
 
(-0.46) (-0.88) (0.81) (1.96) (0.26) 
Cashrestgt 0.028 -0.117 0.115 0.153 0.199 
 
(0.29) (-1.05) (0.75) (0.63) (0.89) 
Bidgear 0.004 0.002 0.197 0.063 -0.091 
 
(0.67) (0.21) (1.05) (0.28) (-0.25) 
Tgtgear -0.082 -0.060 -0.149 -0.287 0.003 
 
(0.99) (-0.46) (-0.97) (-1.12) (0.01) 
Roetgt 0.044 0.121* 0.016 0.062 -0.590** 
 
(1.52) (1.67) (0.39) (1.39) (-2.24) 
Relateddum 0.019 0.007 0.031 -0.037 -0.024 
 
(0.67) (0.21) (0.66) (-0.42) (-0.25) 
Logrelsize -0.019** -0.035** -0.005 -0.017 -0.020 
 
(-2.89) (-3.30) (-0.53) (-0.82) (-1.44) 
Shares -0.028 -0.000 -0.146** -0.168* -0.072 
 
(-0.91) (-0.01) (-2.63) (-1.95) (-0.99) 
Bidtoe -0.003** -0.002** -0.003 -0.003 -0.030** 
 
(-3.01) (-2.02) (-1.13) (-0.41) (-2.75) 
Hostile 0.144** 0.102 0.162 0.315 0.291* 
 
(2.27) (1.39) (1.35) (1.09) (1.98) 
Forex -0.144 
 




(-1.90) (1.31) (-2.46) 
Totdiff 
  
-0.006 -0.006 -0.014** 
   
(-1.19) (-0.18) (-2.57) 
N 250 140 110 53 45 
Adj Rsq 9.21% 17.21% 11.70% 26.59% 33.09% 
      Note: the table shows the regression estimates of the target’s five-day cumulative abnormal return (-2,2) surrounding 
the announcement controlling for acquirer and target firm and other deal characteristics. Significance levels at 1%, 







Agrawal, A., Jaffe, J., & Mandelker,G. (1992). The post-merger performance of acquiring firms: 
A re-examination of an anomaly. Journal of Finance, 47,1605-1622. 
Alexandridis, G., Antoniou, A., & Zhao, H. (2008). Belief asymmetry and gains from 
acquisitions. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 18, 443-60. 
Alexandridis, G. G., Petmezas, D. D., and Travlos, N. G. ( 2010), Gains from Mergers and 
Acquisitions Around the World: New Evidence, Financial Management, 39, 1671‐1695 
Ang, J.S., & Cheng, Y. (2006). Direct evidence on market-driven acquisitions theory. Journal of 
Financial Research, 29, 199-216. 
Asquith P., Bruner, R., & Mullins, D. (1983). The gains to bidding firms from merger. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 11, 121-39. 
Aw, M., & Chatterjee, R. (2000). The performance of UK firms acquiring large cross-border and 
domestic takeover targets. Applied Financial Economics, 14, 337-49. 
Beitel, P., Schiereck,D., & Wahrenburg,M. (2004). Explaining M&A success in European banks. 
European Financial Management, 10, 109-139 
Berkovitch, E., & Narayanan, M. (1993). Motives for takeovers: an empirical investigation. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.28, 1993, pp.347-62. 
Bertrand, O., & Zuniga, P. (2006). R&D and M&A: Are Cross-border M&As different? An 
investigation on OECD countries. International Journal of Industrial Organisation,  24, 401-23. 
Betton,S., & Eckbo, B.E. (2000). Toeholds, bid jumps and expected payoffs in takeovers, Review 
of Financial Studies, 13, 841-82. 
Betton, S., Eckbo, B.E., & Thorburn, K.S. (2009). Merger negotiations and the toehold puzzle. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 91, 158-178 
Bi, X.G., & Gregory, A. (2011). Stock market driven acquisitions versus the Q theory of 
takeovers: UK evidence. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 38, 628-656 
Bradley, M,. (1980). Inter-firm tender offers and the market for corporate control, Journal of 
Business, 53, 345-76. 
Bris, A., & Cabolis, C. (2008). The Value of Investor Protection: Firm Evidence from Cross-
Border Mergers. Review of Financial Studies, 21, 605-648. 
 26 
Cakici, N., Hessel, C,. & Tandon, K. (1991). Foreign acquisitions in the United States and the 
effect on shareholder wealth, Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 3, 
39-60. 
Campa, J.M., & Hernando, I. (2004). Shareholder value creation in European M&As. European 
Financial Management, 10, 47-82. 
Conn, R.L., & Nielsen, J.F. (1977). An empirical test of Larson-Gonedes exchange ratio 
determination model. Journal of Finance, 32, 749-59. 
Conn, R.L., & Connell, F. (1990). International mergers: returns to US and British firms, Journal 
of Business Finance and Accounting, 17, 689-711. 
Conn, R.L., Cosh, A., Guest, P., & Hughes, H. (2005). The impact on UK acquirers of domestic, 
cross-border, public and private acquisitions. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 32, 
815 -70. 
Corhay, A., & Rad, A.T., (2000). International acquisitions and shareholder wealth: evidence 
from the Netherlands. International Review of Financial Analysis, 9, 164-74. 
Dahlquist,M., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz,R., & Williamson,R. (2003). Corporate Governance and the 
Home Bias. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 87-109 
Danbolt, J. (1995). An analysis of gains and losses to shareholders of foreign bidding companies 
engaged in cross border acquisitions into the United Kingdom, 1986-1991. European Journal of 
Finance, 1, 279-309. 
Danbolt, J. (2004). Target company cross border effects in acquisitions into the UK. European 
Financial Management, 10, 83-108.  
Danbolt, J., & Maciver, G., (2012). Cross-Border versus Domestic Acquistions and the Impact 
on Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 39, 1028-1067. 
Datta, D. K. & Puia,G. (1995). Cross-border acquisitions: an examination of the influence of 
relatedness and cultural fit on shareholder value creation in US acquiring firms, Management 
International Review, 35, 337-59. 
Denis, D.J., Denis, D.K., & Yost, K. (2002). Global diversification, industrial diversification and 
firm value.  Journal of Finance, 57, 1951-79. 
Dewenter, K. (1995). Does the market react differently to domestic and foreign takeover 
announcements? Evidence from the US chemical and retail industries, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 37, 421-41. 
 27 
Dodd, P. (1980). Merger proposals, management discretion and stockholder wealth. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 8, 105-38. 
Dong, M.,Hirshleifer, D., Richardson, S. & Teoh, S.H. (2006). Does investor misevaluation drive 
the takeover market? Journal of Finance, 61, 725-62. 
Dos Santos, M.B., Errunza, V.R., & Miller, D.P. (2008). Does corporate international 
diversification destroy value? Evidence from cross border mergers and acquisitions. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 32, 2716-2724 
Doukas, J., & Kan, O.B. (2006). Does global diversification destroy firm value? Journal of 
International Business Studies, 37, 352-371. 
Doukas, J., & Travlos, N.G. (1988). The effect of corporate multinationalism on shareholders 
wealth; evidence from international acquisitions. Journal of Finance, 43, 1161-1175. 
Draper, P,. & Paudyal, K. (2008). Information Asymmetry and Bidders’ Gains. Journal of 
Business, Finance and Accounting, 35, 376-405. 
Dutta, S., Saadi, S. & Zhu, P. (2013). Does payment method matter in cross-border acquisitions? 
International Review of Economics and Finance, 25, 91-107 
Eckbo, B.E., & Langohr, H. (1989). Information disclosure, method of payment and takeover 
premiums in public and private tender offers in France. Journal of Financial Economics, 24, 
363-403. 
Eckbo, B., & Thornburn D. (2000). Gains to bidder firms revisited: domestic and foreign 
acquisitions in Canada. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 35, 1-25. 
Erel,I.,Liao,R.C., & Weisbach, M.S., (2012). Determinants of Cross-Border Mergers and 
Acquistitions, Journal of Finance, 67,1045-1082 
Eun, C., Kolodny, R., & Scheraga, C.(1996). Cross-border acquisitions and shareholder wealth: 
test of the synergy hypothesis. Journal of Banking and Finance, 20, 1559-82. 
Faccio, M., & Masulis, R.W. (2005). The Choice of Payment Method in European Mergers and 
Acquisitions. Journal of Finance, 60, 1345-1388 
Fatemi A., & Furtado, E. (1988). An empirical investigation of the wealth effects of foreign 
acquisitions, in S. J Khoury and A. Ghosh, A. (eds), Recent Developments on International 
Banking and Finance, 2,  (Lexington Books), 363-79. 
Feito-Ruiz, I,. & Menendez-Requejo, S. (2011). Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions in 
different legal environments. International Review of Law and Economics, 31, 169-187 
 28 
Francis, B. B., Hasan, I., & Sun, X. (2008). Financial market integration and the value of global 
diversification: evidence from US acquirers in cross border mergers and acquisitions. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 32, 1522-40. 
Franks, J,. & Harris, R. (1989). Shareholder wealth effects of corporate takeovers. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 23, 225-49. 
Froot, K,. & Stein, J. (1991). Exchange rates and foreign direct investments: an imperfect capital 
markets approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 1191-217. 
Fueller, K., Netter,J., & Stegemoller, M. (2002). What do returns to acquiring firms tell us? 
Evidence from firms that make many acquisitions.  Journal of Finance, 57, 1763-1793 
Gatignan, H., & Anderson, E. (1988). The multinational corporations degree of control over 
foreign subsidiaries: an empirical test of transaction costs explanation. Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organisation, 4, 305-36. 
Gaughan, P.A. (2002). Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructuring, (New York Wiley). 
Goergen, M,. & Renneboog, L.(2004). Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and 
cross-border takeover bids.  European Financial Management, 10, 9-47. 
Ghosh, A,. &  Jain, P.C. (2000). Financial leverage changes associated with corporate mergers, 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 6, 377-402. 
Gregory, A,. & Mc Corriston, S. (2005). Foreign Acquisitions by UK Limited Companies: Short 
and Long-Run Performance. Journal of Empirical Finance, 12, 99-125.  
Gregory A,. & Michou, M. (2009). Industry cost of capital: UK evidence. Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, 36, 679-704. 
Gregory, A,. & Wang, Y.H. (forthcoming). Cash Acquirers, Free Cash Flow, Shareholder 
Monitoring and Shareholder Returns, Review of Behavioural Finance. 
Harford, J., (1999), Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions.  Journal of Finance, 54, 1969‐ 
1997. 
Harris, R.S,. & Ravenscraft, D.(1991). The role of acquisitions in foreign direct investment: 
evidence from the US stock market. Journal of Finance, 46,  825-44. 
Hagendorff, J., Collins, M,. & Keasy, K. (2008). Investor Protection and the Value Effects of 
Bank Merger Announcements in Europe and the US. Journal of Banking and Finance, 32, 1333-
348. 
 29 
Huizinga, H,. & Voget, J. (2009). International taxation and the direction and volume of cross-
border M&As, Journal of Finance,64, 1215-1246 
Jarrell G,. & Poulsen, A. (1989). The returns to acquiring firms in tender offers; evidence from 
three decades.  Financial Management, 18, 2-19. 
Jensen, M.C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. American 
Economic Review, 76, 323-29. 
Kang, J. (1993). The international market for corporate control: mergers and acquisitions of U.S 
firms by Japanese firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 34,  345-71. 
Kiymaz, H., & Mukherjee, T.K.(2000). The impact of country diversification on wealth effects 
in cross-border mergers.  Financial Review, 35, 37-58. 
Kling, G., & Weitzel, U.(2011). The internationalization of Chinese companies: Firm 
characteristics, industry effects and corporate governance. Research in International Business 
and Finance, 25, 357-372. 
Kuipers, D. R., Miller, D.P., & Patel, A.(2009). The legal environment and corporate valuation: 
Evidence from cross-border takeovers. International Review of Economics and Finance, 18,552-
567 
La Porta,R., Lopez-de-Silanes,F., Shleifer, A., Vishny,R., (1997). Legal determinants of external 
finance, Journal of Finance, 52, 1131-1150 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., (1998). Law and finance. Journal of 
Political Economy, 106, 1113-1155 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, RW. (2000). Investor protection and 
corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 3-27. 
Lang, L., R. Stulz, & Walkling, R., (1991). A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: The Case 
of Bidder Retums.  Journal of Financial Economics. 29, 315‐335. 
Loderer, C., & Martin,K. (1990). Corporate acquisitions by listed firms: The experience of a 
comprehensive sample. Financial Management, 19, 17-33.  
Loughran, T,. & Vingh, A.(1997). Do long term shareholders benefit from corporate 
acquisitions?  Journal of Finance, 52, 1765-90. 
Lyon, J.D., Barber, B.M. & Tsai, C. (1999). Improved Methods for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal 
Stock Returns.  Journal of Finance, 54, 165-201. 
 30 
Maloney, M.T., Mc Cormack, R.E., & Mitchell, M.L.(1993). Managerial Decision Making and 
Capital Structure. Journal of Business, 66, 189-217 
Mantecon, T. (2009). Mitigating risks in cross border acquisitions. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 33, 640-651. 
Manzon, J.B., Sharp, D.J., & Travlos, N.G., (1994), An Empirical Study of the Consequences of 
U.S Tax Rules for International Acquisitions by U.S Firms. Journal of Finance, 49,1893-1904 
Markides, C,.& Ittner, C.D.(1994). Shareholder benefits from corporate international 
diversification: evidence from US international acquisitions. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 2, 343-67. 
Martynova, M and Renneboog, L. (2006). Mergers and acquisitions in Europe: The fifth 
takeover wave. In L Renneboog (Dir), Advances in corporate finance and asset pricing. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Martynova, M., and Renneboog, L. (2008). A century of corporate takeovers: what have we 
learned and where do we stand?  Journal of Banking and Finance, 21, 2148-177.  
Martynova, M., and Renneboog, L. (2011a).  Evidence on the international evolution and 
convergence of corporate governance regulations, Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 1531-1557 
Martynova, M., and Renneboog, L. (2011b).  The Performance of the European Market for 
Corporate Control: Evidence from the Fifth Takeover Wave. European Financial Management, 
17, 208-259 
Manzon, J. B., Sharp, D. J., and Travlos, N. G., (1994). An Empirical Study of the Consequences 
of U.S. Tax Rules for International Acquisitions by U.S. Firms, Journal Of Finance,49, 1893‐ 
1904 
McCahery, J., and Renneboog, L. (2002). Recent developments in corporate governance’, in 
J.McCaery, P.Moerland, T.Raaijmakers and L.Renneboog (eds), Convergence and Diversity of 
Corporate Governance, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Michou, M., Mouselli, S. and Stark A.W. (2007). ‘Estimating the Fama and French Factors in 
the UK: An Empirical Review’, Manchester Business School Working paper series, 
http://www.mbs.ac.uk/research/workingpapers/index.aspx?AuthorId=381 
Moeller, S.B., & Schlingemann, F.P. (2005). Global diversification and bidder gains: a 
comparison between cross-border and domestic acquisitions. Journal of Banking and Finance, 
29, 533-64. 
 31 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A,. & Vishny, R. (1988). Managerial ownership and market valuation: an 
empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A,. & Vishny, R. (1990). Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisitions?’ 
Journal of Finance, 45, 31-48. 
Moschieri, C,. &  Campa, J.M. (2009). The European M&A Industry: A Market in the Process of 
Construction.  Academy of Management Perspectives,23, 71-87. 
Morellec, E. & Zhdanov, A. (2008). Financing and takeovers. Journal of Financial Economics, 
87, 556-581 
Myers, S.C., & Majluf N.S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms 
have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 49, 223-53. 
Petmezas, D. (2009). What drives acquisitions? market valuations and bidder performance. 
Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 19,54-74. 
Reuer, J.J., Shenkar, O,. & Robertor, R. (2004). Mitigating risk in international mergers and 
acquisitions; the role of contingent payouts. Journal of International Business Studies, 35, 19-32. 
Rossi, S., 7 Volpin,P. F. (2004). Cross-country determinants of mergers and acquisitions. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 74, 277-304  
Schleifer, A.& Vishny, R. (2003). Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 70, 295-311.  
Schwert, G.W. (2000). Hostility in takeovers: in the eyes of the beholder? Journal of Finance,  
55, 2599-640. 
Servaes, H,. & Zenner, M. (1990). The returns to foreign acquisitions in the United States. 
Working paper, (Center for Research in Security Prices, University of Chicago) 
Slusky, A.R,. & Caves,R.E. (1991). Synergy, agency and the determinants of premiums paid in 
mergers. Journal of Industrial Economics, 39, 277-96. 
Starks,L.T,. & Wei,K. (2013). Cross-border mergers and differences in coporate governance. 
International Review of Finance, doi:10.111/irfi./2008 
Stulz, R, M., Walkling, M,. & Song, M.H. (1990). The distribution of target ownership and the 
division of gains in successful takeovers. Journal of Finance, 45, 817-33. 
Sudarsanam, S.P,. Holl, P,. & Salami, A.M. (1996). Shareholder wealth gains in mergers: effect 
of synergy and ownership structure. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 23, 673-98. 
Travlos, N.,(1987). Corporate Takeover Bids, Method of Payment, and Bidding Firms' Stock 
 32 
Returns.  Journal of Finance,  42, 943‐963. 
Walker, M. (2000). Corporate takeovers, strategic objectives and acquiring-firm shareholder 
wealth.  Financial Management, 29, 53-66. 
White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test 
for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica,  48, 817-38. 
 
 
 
 
